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Abstract. In this paper we present the first related-key rectangle cryptanalysis of Rijndael-160/160
and Rijndael-192/192. Our attack on Rijndael-160/160 covers eight rounds. The attack complexities
are 2126.5 chosen plaintexts, 2129.28 8-round Rijndael-160/160 encryptions and 2132.82 bytes. Our attack
on Rijndael-192/192 covers ten rounds. It requires 2179 chosen plaintexts, 2181.09 10-round Rijndael-
192/192 encryptions and 2185.59 bytes memory. These are the currently best cryptanalytic results on
Rijndael-160/160 and Rijndael-192/192 in terms of the number of attacked rounds. Furthermore, our
results show that the slow diffusion in the key schedule of Rijndael makes it a target for this type of
analysis.
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1 Introduction
Block ciphers are used widely in cryptography to ensure confidentiality and authenticity. They are needed
both in software and in hardware. For example, they are used in electronic payments or for wireless security.
For different demands, different algorithms are designed [1–3] and they have been standardised as well.
Apart from this main functionality, block ciphers are also used as underlying primitives in the design of hash
functions or pseudo-random number generators.
Rijndael [2] is a block cipher designed by Daemen and Rijmen and is a substitution-permutation network
following the wide-trail strategy. Both the block length and the key length can be any multiple of 32 bits, with
a minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 256 bits, independently of each other with key size greater than
or equal to block size. The 128-bit block variant of Rijndael has been chosen as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [4]. This paper deals with non-AES Rijndael variants, that is, Rijndael-b/k where b indicates
the block size and k indicates the key size in bits.
Without doubt AES is one of the most well-studied block ciphers: since its introduction 15 years ago there
has been extensive analysis of AES. Some prominent examples include square attacks, impossible differential
attacks, boomerang attacks, rectangle attacks and meet-in-the-middle attacks in both the single-key and
related-key settings [5–18].
On the other hand, the variants of Rijndael with larger block sizes have got arguably less attention
from the cryptographic community. Current analysis includes several multiset and integral attacks [19–22],
as well as impossible differential cryptanalysis [23–25]. A summary of these attacks and their time and
data complexities are given in Table 1. An important motivation for the study of large-block Rijndael is
the deployment of Rijndael-like permutations in the design of hash functions, Whirlwind [26], SHAvite-
3 [27], Whirlpool [28], ECHO [29], PHOTON [30] and SHA-3 finalist Grøstl [31] constituting some especially
interesting instances.
The rectangle attack [32] introduced by Biham et al. is a special type of differential cryptanalysis. The
main idea of the attack is to divide the cipher E into two sub-ciphers E0 and E1 such that E = E1 ◦E0. The
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attacker then constructs two relatively short differentials for E0 and E1 instead of finding a long differential
for the block cipher E. After that, a rectangle distinguisher for E can be established by combining these two
short differentials delicately. This technique is useful when we have short differentials with high probability
instead of long ones with lower differential probabilities.
In the related-key model, the attacker can decrypt/encrypt not only under the master key K, but also
under the keys f1(K), f2(K) . . . fm(K), which are called related-keys. The relations fi are chosen by the
attacker in advance. The aim of the attacker is to recover the master keys. The first related-key attacks
consider simple mappings, for example, rotations [33] and bit flips [34]. Recent attack on AES [18] exploits
the difference not between the master keys but between the subkeys. The extra control might make the attack
harder to mount in practice. However, the designers still usually make great efforts to build ideal primitives
which can be used without further cryptanalysis to the applications of modes of operation or protocols.
Related-key attacks are applied to the attacks on the protocols that use ciphers as a building block [35].
Contrasting to the single-key attack, related-key attack recovers a secret parameter of the protocol. Therefore
resistance to related-key attack becomes one of the important design aims for block ciphers, actually this
was also stated as one of the design goals of the Rijndael.
Moreover it is also possible to combine rectangle-type attack with related-key attack to derive a more
efficient cryptanalytic approach [36]. Actually, this type of combined approach has been applied to various
block ciphers and some intriguing results have been achieved for AES [18,37] and KASUMI [38,39].
Contributions. In this paper we propose related-key rectangle attacks on reduced-round versions of Rijndael-
160/160 and Rijndael-192/192. Our attacks use the idea of switch technique [40] and local collisions in [18].
We construct 6 and 8-round rectangle distinguishers of Rijndael-160/160 and Rijndael-192/192, based on
which we attack 8 and 10 rounds of these two ciphers respectively. To our knowledge, our results are the best
ones in terms of the number of attacked rounds. The attacks on Rijndael-160/160 and Rijndael-192/192 are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Attacks on Rijndael-160/160 and Rijndael-192/192
Cipher
# Complexity
Attack Type Ref.Rounds Time(EN) Data(CP) Memory(Bytes)
R
ijn
d
a
el-1
6
0
/
1
6
0
6 2135 2105.5 - Imp. Diff. [23]
6 281.9 2147 - Imp. Diff. [24]
7 2144 2130.6 2128 Multiset [20]
7 281.9 2147 - Imp. Diff. [24]
7 2108 294.6 292 Integral [41]
7 298.6 298.6 - Integral [22]
8 2129.28 2126.5
†
2132.82 RK Rectangle §5
R
ijn
d
a
el-1
9
2
/
1
9
2
6 2151 2121.5 293 Imp. Diff. [23]
6 2113.8 293.2 293 Imp. Diff. [24]
7 2120 2128 − 2119 261 Partial Sum [19]
7 2144 2130.6 2128 Multiset [20]
7 266.6 266.6 - Integral [22]
7 2174.5 228.5 - Integral [22]
8 2188 2128 − 2119 Partial Sum [19]
8 2177.4 2158 2157 Imp. Diff. [24]
8 281.4 2179 261 Imp. Diff. [24]
8 2174.5 268.5 - Integral [22]
8 2162.6 2162.6 - Integral [22]
9 2174.5 2164.5 - Integral [22]
10 2181.09 2179
‡
2185.59 RK Rectangle §6
CP: Chosen Plaintext; EN: Encryptions
† 2128.5 ciphertexts under 4 related keys; ‡ 2181 ciphertexts under 4 related keys
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Outline. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief description of Rijndael and the
notations used in our analysis. Section 3 introduces the rectangle attack briefly and shows our rectangle
distinguishers. We demonstrate our attacks on Rijndael-160/160 and Rijndael-192/192 in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Description of Rijndael and Notations
In Rijndael, each data block (plaintext, ciphertext, subkey, or intermediate step) is represented by a 4×Nb
state matrix of bytes, where Nb is the block size divided by 32. The state is then transformed by iterating
a round function. The round function is composed of the following four operations:
– SubBytes (SB) : a non-linear byte substitution (8× 8-bit S-box) that acts on every byte of the state.
– ShiftRows (SR): a cyclic shift of bytes in a row that acts individually on each of the last three rows of
the state. The shift offset Ci of row i depends on the block length Nb (See Fig. 1).
– MixColumns (MC): a linear transformation (based on an [8, 4, 5] MDS code over GF (28)) that acts inde-
pendently on every column of the state
– AddRoundKey (AK): the exclusive-or of the round key with the intermediate state.
The number of rounds for the cipher Nr varies with Nb and Nk (the key size divided by 32). Before
the first round, there exists a whitening layer consisting of AddRoundKey only, and in the last round the
MixColumns operation is omitted. We assume that this is also the case for the reduced round versions of
Rijndael.
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Fig. 1. Byte Index of the State Matrix and the Shift Offsets for Each Block Length Nb
Key Scheduling: The key schedule derives (Nr+1) b-bit round keys RK0, RK1 . . .RKNr from the master
key. It consists of a linear array of 4-byte words denoted byW [i] for 0 ≤ i ≤ Nb · (Nr+1). The first Nk words
W [0]‖W [1]‖ · · · ‖W [Nk−1] are directly initialized with the words of the master key, while the remaining key
words, W [i] for i ∈ [Nk, Nk · (Nr + 1)− 1] are generated by the following algorithm:
if (i mod Nk = 0) then W [i] =W [i−Nk]⊕ SB(W [i− 1] ≪ 8)⊕Rcon[i/Nk]
else if (Nk > 6 and i mod Nk = 4) then W [i] =W [i−Nk]⊕ SB(W [i− 1])
else W [i] =W [i−Nk]⊕W [i− 1]
where ≪ denotes the rotation of the word to the left and Rcon[·] denotes the fixed constants. Then the
round key RKi is given by the words W [Nb · i] to W [Nb · (i+ 1)]. The key expansion and the the round key
selection of Rijndael-160/160 are illustrated in Figure 2. Here we only give a brief description of Rijndael,
for more detailed specification of the cipher, we refer to [2].
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W [0] W [1] W [2] W [3] W [4] W [6] W [7] W [8] W [9] W [56] W [57] W [58] W [59]
RK0 RK1 RK11
· · ·
· · ·
W [5n] = W [5n− 5]⊕ SB(W [5n− 1] <<< 8)⊕Rcon[n]
W [i] = W [5i− 5]⊕W [5i− 1], i 6= 5n
W [5] W [55]
Fig. 2. Key expansion and round key selection for Nb = Nk = 5.
Notation: The notation that we will use throughout this paper is as follows:
Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd the plaintexts
(Pa)i,j ,(Pb)i,j ,(Pc)i,j ,(Pd)i,j the byte at row i column j of the plaintext state
Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd the ciphertexts
Ka, Kb, Kc, Kd secret related keys
(Ka)i,j , (Kb)i,j , (Kc)i,j , (Kd)i,j the byte at row i column j of the secret related keys
Kra, K
r
b , K
r
c , K
r
d secret subkey of Ka, Kb, Kc and Kd in round r
∆Krab, ∆K
r
ac, ∆K
r
cd, ∆K
r
bd the difference of the related keys in round r
(∆Krab)i,j difference byte of state ∆K
r
ab, at position row i and column j
SB[(i, j)] the SB operation on the byte at row i column j of the state matrix
SB[{(i, j)}] the SB operation on the subset bytes {(i, j)} of the state matrix
E(·, ·) encryption operation defined as {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n
3 Rectangle Attack
The rectangle attack introduced by Biham et al. [32] aims to reduce the complexity of the differential
cryptanalysis. The main idea is to use two short differential characteristics with high probabilities instead of
one long characteristic with a lower probability. It is also possible to combine rectangle attack with related-
key attack to derive the related-key rectangle attack [36] in which the attacker can query to the cipher with
other keys that have a specified relation (often an xor-difference) with the original key.
E0 E0
E0 E0
E1 E1
E1
Pb
Pa
Pd
Pc
Cb Cd
Ca Cc
α
β
γ
γ
β
α
δ
δ E1
∆Kab
∆Kac
Fig. 3. The Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher
Let the encryption function E of the block cipher be considered as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E =
E1 ◦ E0. Assume that there exists a related-key differential α → β for E0 under the key difference ∆Kab
with probability p, i.e., (Pr[E0(P,K) ⊕ E0((P ⊕ α), (K ⊕ ∆Kab)) = β] = p). Similarly, assume that there
exists a related-key differential γ → δ for E1 under the key difference ∆Kac with probability q, where ∆Kab
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and ∆Kac are the key differences known by the attackers. A related-key rectangle distinguisher is then as
follows:
1. Choose N plaintext pairs (Pa, Pb) with Pb = Pa ⊕ α at random. Ask for the encryption of Pa under Ka
and of Pb under Kb, respectively, where Kb = Ka ⊕∆Kab.
2. Choose N plaintext pairs (Pc, Pd) with Pd = Pc ⊕ α at random. Ask for the encryption of Pc under Kc
and of Pd under Kd, respectively, where Kc = Ka ⊕∆Kac and Kd = Kc ⊕∆Kab = Kb ⊕∆Kac.
3. For a quartet of plaintexts (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd) with corresponding ciphertexts (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd), check whether
Ca ⊕ Cc = Cb ⊕ Cd = δ holds or not. If yes, we call it a right rectangle quartet. Fig. 3 illustrates the
related-key rectangle distinguisher.
The related-key rectangle attack can be mounted for all possible β’s and γ’s simultaneously. Firstly, we can
use any γ for which γ
E1−−→ δ holds. This is equivalent to mounting the attack for all values of γ with the
condition (E0(Pa), E0(Pc)) and (E0(Pb), E0(Pd)) have the same difference (γ). In this case the probability
that conditions of the distinguisher are satisfied is
2−np2
∑
γ
E1−−→δ
Pr2[γ
E1−−→ δ] = 2−np2qˆ2,
where n is the block size, and qˆ =
√∑
γ
E1−−→δ
Pr2[γ
E1−−→ δ]. Similarly, we can use all β values simultaneously
as well. Conditions for this case become: E0(Pa)⊕E0(Pb) = E0(Pc)⊕E0(Pd) = β and E0(Pa)⊕E0(Pc) = γ
and the quartet has probability Pr2[γ → δ] to become a right quartet. Hence, the probability that a given
quartet is a right quartet is
2−n
∑
α
E0−−→β
Pr2[α
E0−−→ β]
∑
γ
E1−−→δ
Pr2[γ
E1−−→ δ] = 2−npˆ2qˆ2,
where pˆ =
√∑
α
E0−−→β
Pr2[α
E0−−→ β]. Therefore starting with N plaintext pairs with difference α, we expect
to find N22−n(pˆqˆ)2 right quartets. For an ideal cipher, Step 3 is expected to hold with probability 2−2n.
Therefore, if pˆqˆ ≫ 2−n/2, the algorithm above allows to distinguish E from an ideal cipher. We refer
to [32,36,42,43] for more detail.
3.1 Local Collision
SB
SR MC
Disturbance
Correction
AK
AK
Fig. 4. A Local Collision of Rijndael-160/160
Disturbance
Correction
Key
+
‖
Fig. 5. Constructing Related-keys from Local Collisions
A local collision is a differential that starts and ends with the zero difference in the internal state, but is
non-zero in the middle. The idea of local collisions has been first introduced by Joux and Chabaud [44] to
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attack hash functions. It aims to inject a difference (called disturbance, in red) into an intermediate step and
then to correct the resulting differences with the injections in the next steps (called correction, in grey) to
obtain a collision. The goal is to reduce the complexity of the attack by having as few disturbances as possible.
This idea has been later successfully applied to block ciphers in [18]. A local collision of Rijndael-160/160 is
shown in Fig. 4.
In order to construct an optimal trail, first of all we construct a minimal-weight disturbance layer, which
will become a part of the key schedule difference. Then, correction layer is constructed by encrypting on the
previous round of the disturbance layer. The key schedule difference is the sum of the disturbance and the
correction layers. The 4-round Rijndael-160/160 key schedule difference constructed from local collisions is
illustrated in Fig. 5. We follow this approach in our analysis of Rijndael-160/160 and Rijndael-192/192.
3.2 The Related Keys
In order to mount the related-key attacks presented in this paper, the adversary needs to construct the
relations between different keys as follows.
Regarding Rijndael-160/160, for a secret key Ka, which the attacker tries to find, we define a simple
form of this relation as xor with a constant to obtain Kb: Kb = Ka ⊕ ∆K
0
ab, where the constant ∆K
0
ab is
chosen in advance (see Table 2). Then we compute the subkeys K4a and K
4
b , based on which, the subkeys K
4
c
and K4d can be calculated by using the subkey difference ∆K
4
ac. After that, according to the key schedule of
Rijndael-160/160, we can derive Kc and Kd from the subkeys K
4
c and K
4
d , respectively. This is depicted in
Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. The Related-Key Computation of Rijndael-160/160
For Rijndael-192/192, a more complex non-linear forms of the relation between the keys will be adopted.
We choose a desired XOR relation in the second subkey as ∆K1ab, and then define the implied relation
between the actual keys Ka and Kb as: Kb = F
−1(F (Ka)⊕∆K
1
ab) where F represents a single round of the
Rijndael-192/192 key schedule. Similar to Rijndael-160/160, we can define the relation between Kb, Kc and
Kd for Rijndael-192/192 (see Table 3).
3.3 Rectangle Switch
In this Subsection we focus on the transition between the top characteristic E0 and the bottom characteristic
E1 of the rectangle. This method is called switch technique [40] and it has been used to improve the proba-
bility of boomerang distinguisher [18, 39, 45]. In this paper, we apply this switch technique to our rectangle
distinguishers on Rijndael. Let E be (m + n)-round Rijndael cipher. Then, the common application is to
choose
E0 = (AK ◦MC ◦ SR ◦ SB)
m
E1 = (AK ◦MC ◦ SR ◦ SB)
n
6
Table 2. Related-key Differences for Rijndael-160
∆K
r
ab
0
3f 3e 3f 3e 00
1
3f 01 3e 00 00
2
3f 3e 00 00 00
3
3f 01 01 01 01
1f 1f 1f 1f 00 1f 00 1f 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00
1f 1f 1f 1f 00 1f 00 1f 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00
21 21 21 21 00 21 00 21 00 00 21 21 00 00 00 21 00 00 00 00
∆K
r
ac
4
21 21 21 21 00
5
21 00 21 00 00
6
21 21 00 00 00
7
21 00 00 00 00
3e 3f 3e 3f 00 3e 01 3f 00 00 3e 3f 00 00 00 3e 01 01 01 01
1f 1f 1f 1f 00 1f 00 1f 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00
1f 1f 1f 1f 00 1f 00 1f 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00
8
21⊕ x∗ 21⊕ x 21⊕ x 21⊕ x 21⊕ x
3e 3f 3e 3f 3e
1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
∗
x might differ for ∆K8ac and ∆K
8
bd
Table 3. Related-key Differences for Rijndael-192
∆K
r
ab
0
? 3e 00 00 3f 3e
1
3f 01 01 01 3e 00
2
3f 3e 3f 3e 00 00
? 1f 00 00 1f 1f 1f 00 00 00 1f 00 1f 1f 1f 1f 00 00
? 1f 00 00 1f 1f 1f 00 00 00 1f 00 1f 1f 1f 1f 00 00
? 21 00 00 21 21 21 00 00 00 21 00 21 21 21 21 00 00
3
3f 01 3e 00 00 00
4
3f 3e 00 00 00 00
5
3f 01 01 01 01 01
1f 00 1f 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00 00
1f 00 1f 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00 00
21 00 21 00 00 00 21 21 00 00 00 00 21 00 00 00 00 00
∆K
r
ac
6
00 21 21 21 21 00
7
00 21 00 21 00 00
8
00 21 21 00 00 00
00 3e 3f 3e 3f 00 00 3e 01 3f 00 00 00 3e 3f 00 00 00
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 00 00 1f 00 1f 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 00 00 1f 00 1f 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00 00
9
00 21 00 00 00 00 10 x∗ 21⊕x 21⊕x 21⊕x 21⊕x 21⊕x
00 3e 01 01 01 01 00 3e 3f 3e 3f 3e
00 1f 00 00 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
00 1f 00 00 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
∗
x might differ for ∆K10ac and ∆K
10
bd
However, due to the flexibility of the SB operation (i.e., it is applied to each byte in the state independently),
this choice of E0, E1 can be done in a more clever way. Let {(i, j)} and {(i
′, j′)} be subsets of the state set,
SB[{(i, j)}] and SB[{(i′, j′)}] be the SB operations on the bytes {(i, j)} and {(i′, j′)}, respectively. Then E0
and E1 can alternatively be defined as follows:
E0 = SB[{(i, j)}] ◦ (AK ◦MC ◦ SR ◦ SB)
m,
E1 = (AK ◦MC ◦ SR ◦ SB)
n−1 ◦AK ◦MC ◦ SR ◦ SB[{(i′, j′)}], (1)
where {(i, j)} is the absolute complement of {(i′, j′)} in the state set, and the bytes (i, j) and (i′, j′) are
passive in E0 and E1, respectively. For example, in our rectangle distinguisher of Rijndael-160/160, we take
m = 2, n = 4. The first subcipher E0 covers rounds 2–3 of Rijndael-160/160 and SB operations on 12 bytes
(i, j) in round 4, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4; The second subcipher E1 starts with the SB operations on
8 bytes (i′, 0), (0, j′) in round 4 (1 ≤ i′ ≤ 3, 0 ≤ j′ ≤ 4), followed by AK ◦MC ◦ SR and rounds 5–7. Our
6-round rectangle distinguisher is illustrated in Fig. 7.
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4 The Rectangle Distinguishers
In the analysis of Rijndael-160/160, we use a 6-round rectangle distinguisher, and extend one round before
and after the distinguisher respectively (see Fig. 7). Our rectangle distinguisher covers rounds 2–7 and we
use the switch technique in round 4 to avoid the active S-boxes in the key schedule and hence to reduce the
complexity of our attack. We take m = 2 and n = 4 in Equation (1) to obtain E0 and E1.
The plaintext difference α is specified in 16 bytes, two of them (denoted in dark green) can take any value
whereas the remaining ones (denoted in gray) are fixed to (0x3e,0x1f,0x1f,0x21)T. The key difference is
chosen such that when it is xored to the state, all differences cancel each other except the two bytes at (0, 0)
and (0, 2) of the top characteristic. For the differences in these two active bytes we have:
(0x01⊕ α0,i)
SB
−−→ 0x1f, i ∈ {0, 2} (2)
This guarantees that the input differences to the S-box operations in all the internal states (except the ones
specified in Equation 2) are 0x01. For the active bytes in round 2 of the top characteristic, we adopt 0x1f
as the output difference of SB operation in order to achieve the optimal differential probability 2−6. We
develop the bottom characteristic by taking an similar approach. As to the active byte in round 3 of the top
characteristic, there are 127 possibilities of the output difference for the input difference 0x01 according to
the differential distribution table of SB operation, among which one happens with the probability 2−6, the
others happen with probability 2−7. Then we construct the 6-round related-key rectangle distinguisher by
combining the 127 top characteristics and one bottom characteristic mentioned above.
The probability of the 6-round distinguisher can be computed as follows.
– There are three active S-boxes in rounds 2–3, thus the probability of the 127 differentials for E0 can be
calculated as pˆ =
√
(2−6)2·2[1 · (2−6)2 + 126 · (2−7)2] ≈ 2−10.5.
– There are five active S-boxes in rounds 4–7, thus the probability of the differential for E1 is qˆ = (2
−6)5 =
2−30.
– In total, the probability of this distinguisher can be calculated as (2−10.5 · 2−30)2 · 2−160 = 2−251.
Similarly, we find a 8-round rectangle distinguisher for Rijndael-192/192 which covers rounds 2–9, and the
rectangle switch technique is applied at round 6 (see Fig. 8). There are 9 active S-boxes in the differential char-
acteristics of E0 (Note that for the active S-box in round 5, all the 127 possible output differences are used to
derive 127 characteristics), and the probability can be computed as pˆ =
√
(2−6)2·8[1 · (2−6)2 + 126 · (2−7)2] ≈
2−51.5. For the differential characteristic of E1, there are 5 active S-boxes and the probability is qˆ = (2
−6)5 =
2−30. In total, the distinguisher holds with probability (2−51.5 · 2−30)2 · 2−192 = 2−355.
Moreover, the differences after the MC operations (denoted in gray) are given as:


0x1f
0
0
0

 MC−−→


0x3e
0x1f
0x1f
0x21

 ;


0
0x1f
0
0

 MC−−→


0x21
0x3e
0x1f
0x1f


5 Attack on 8-Round Rijndael-160/160
By using the 6-round distinguisher for round 2–7 given in Subsection 4, we now present a key recovery attack
on 8-round Rijndael-160/160 (round 1–8). Based on Fig. 7, an adversary aims to collect sufficient plaintext
quartets such that among these plaintext quartets there are averagely 4 right quartets with respect to the
6-round distinguisher. Then among all the collected plaintext quartets, the expected number of quartets
satisfying the input and output differences of this distinguisher for a random permutation is (4/2−251) ·
2−320 = 2−67. From this the adversary could distinguish the correct value from the wrong guessed values
of the subkey bytes adopted in rounds 1 and 8 which are related to the 6-round distinguisher with a high
probability. The attack procedure is divided into two phases: data collection phase and key recovery phase.
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Fig. 7. The Related-key Rectangle Attack on 8-Round Rijndael-160/160. Switch is applied in Round 4
Data Collection
1. Collect N structures Gi = {Ui, Vi} of 2
17 plaintexts each, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , Ui, Vi are the sets of 2
16
plaintexts of the form
? c1 ? c2 c3
c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
c9 c10 c11 c12 c13
c14 c15 c16 c17 c18
and
? c1 ⊕ 3e ? c2 ⊕ 3e c3
c4 ⊕ 1f c5 ⊕ 1f c6 ⊕ 1f c7 ⊕ 1f c8
c9 ⊕ 1f c10 ⊕ 1f c11 ⊕ 1f c12 ⊕ 1f c13
c14⊕21 c15 ⊕ 21 c16 ⊕ 21 c17 ⊕ 21 c18
,
respectively, c′is (1 ≤ i ≤ 18) are fixed 8-bit values and ‘?’ takes all possible values.
2. For each structure Gi
(a) Ask for the encryption of Ui, Vi under Ka and Kb, respectively, to obtain G
1
i = {X
1
i , Y
1
i }.
(b) Ask for the encryption of Vi, Ui under Ka and Kb, respectively, to obtain G
2
i = {X
2
i , Y
2
i }.
(c) Ask for the encryption of Ui, Vi under Kc and Kd, respectively, to obtain H
1
i = {Z
1
i ,W
1
i }.
(d) Ask for the encryption of Vi, Ui under Kc and Kd, respectively, to obtain H
2
i = {Z
2
i ,W
2
i }.
3. Let T 1a = {X1i }1≤i≤N , T
1b = {Y 1i }1≤i≤N , T
2a = {X2i }1≤i≤N , T
2b = {Y 2i }1≤i≤N , T
1c = {Z1i }1≤i≤N ,
T 1d = {W 1i }1≤i≤N , T
2c = {Z2i }1≤i≤N and T
2d = {W 2i }1≤i≤N . Then for the case of (T
1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d),
we can construct (216 · 216 · N)2 = 264 · N2 plaintext quartets meeting the input difference of round
1 given in Fig. 7. Similarly we can obtain 264 · N2 plaintext quartets satisfying the input difference
of round 1 for (T 1a, T 1b, T 2c, T 2d), (T 2a, T 2b, T 1c, T 1d) and (T 2a, T 2b, T 2c, T 2d), respectively, resulting
in 264 · N2 · 4 = 266 · N2 plaintext quartets in total. Among these plaintext quartets there are about
266 ·N2 · (2−16)2 · 2−251 = 2−217 ·N2 right quartets. Let 2−217 ·N2 = 4, we can deduce that N = 2109.5.
4. Next, derive ciphertext quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) and corresponding plaintext quartets (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd)
from (T 1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d), (T 1a, T 1b, T 2c, T 2d), (T 2a, T 2b, T 1c, T 1d) and (T 2a, T 2b, T 2c, T 2d) in an efficient
way, such that (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd), (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) satisfy the input and output differences of rounds 1 and
8, respectively, as shown in Fig. 7. Firstly, for the case of (T 1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d) do the following:
– Initialize two vectors Lac and Lbd consisting of 288 lists Lacη and L
bd
η , respectively, where η corresponds
to a 11-byte value (i.e., the bytes (1,4) and (i, j) of a ciphertext, where 2 ≤ i ≤ 3, 0 ≤ j ≤ 4),
Lacη = {S
a
η , S
c
η, N
a
η , N
c
η}, L
bd
η = {S
b
η, S
d
η , N
b
η , N
d
η }, S
a
η , S
b
η, S
c
η, S
d
η are the sets of ciphertexts under
Ka, Kb, Kc and Kd, respectively, as well as their structure indices, and N
a
η , N
b
η , N
c
η , N
d
η denote the
cardinalities of the sets Saη , S
b
η, S
c
η and S
d
η , respectively.
– For each ciphertext in T 1a, extract the 88-bit value η, then insert the ciphertext and its structure
index into the set Saη of the corresponding list L
ac
η and increase N
a
η by 1. For each ciphertext in T
1c,
xor it with
9
00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 3e
1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
and then extract the 88-bit value η. After that, insert the ciphertext and its structure index into the
set Scη of the corresponding list L
ac
η and increase N
c
η by 1. Do similarly for the ciphertexts in T
1b,
T 1d and update the lists Lbdη .
– Keep the lists Lacη in which both N
a
η and N
c
η are non-zero, and keep the lists L
bd
η in which both N
b
η
and Ndη are non-zero. Then derive the ciphertext quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) from the remaining lists
Lacη and L
bd
η by using following criteria:
• Ca, Cc are chosen from the same list L
ac
η , and Cb, Cd come from the same list L
bd
η′ .
• The structure indices of Ca and Cb are the same, and the structure indices of Cc and Cd are the
same.
We obtain around (216 · 216 · 2109.5)2 · (2−88)2 = 2107 ciphertext quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) and their
plaintext quartets (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd) in this step.
– For each of the 2107 quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd), check whether the following conditions
(Ca ⊕ Cc)0,0 = (Ca ⊕ Cc)0,1 = . . . = (Ca ⊕ Cc)0,4
and
(Cb ⊕ Cd)0,0 = (Cb ⊕ Cd)0,1 = . . . = (Cb ⊕ Cd)0,4
hold or not. If not, discard the quartet. The expected number of remaining quartets after this step
is about 2107 · (2−32)2 = 243.
Do similarly for (T 1a, T 1b, T 2c, T 2d), (T 2a, T 2b, T 1c, T 1d) and (T 2a, T 2b, T 2c, T 2d), respectively, and finally
we get about 243 ·4 = 245 ciphertext quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) and their plaintext quartets (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd).
Key Recovery
5. Guess the subkey bytes (Ka)0,j , (Kc)0,j (j ∈ {0, 2}) as follows:
(a) guess (Ka)0,0, (Kc)0,0 and calculate the values of (Kb)0,0, (Kd)0,0 by using Table 2.
(b) guess (Ka)0,2, (Kc)0,2 and derive the values of (Kb)0,2, (Kd)0,2 from Table 2.
For each of the remaining quartets in substeps (a)–(b), test whether the corresponding equations
SB((Pa)0,j ⊕ (Ka)0,j)⊕ SB((Pb)0,j ⊕ (Kb)0,j) = 1f
SB((Pc)0,j ⊕ (Kc)0,j)⊕ SB((Pd)0,j ⊕ (Kd)0,j) = 1f
are satisfied or not. If not, discard the quartet. After this step, the number of remaining quartets is about
245 · (2−8)4 = 213.
6. Guess the subkey bytes (K7a)1,4, (K
7
b )1,4, (K
8
a)1,j , (K
8
b )1,j (0 ≤ j ≤ 3) and obtain the values of (K
7
c )1,4,
(K7d)1,4, (K
8
c )1,j , (K
8
d)1,j according to Table 2. Then for each remaining quartet (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd), verify
whether the following equations
SB((K7a)1,4)⊕ SB((K
7
c )1,4)⊕ (Ca)0,0 ⊕ (Cc)0,0 = 21
SB((K7b )1,4)⊕ SB((K
7
d)1,4)⊕ (Cb)0,0 ⊕ (Cd)0,0 = 21
SB−1((Ca)1,j ⊕ (K
8
a)1,j)⊕ SB
−1((Cc)1,j ⊕ (K
8
c )1,j) = 01
SB−1((Cb)1,j ⊕ (K
8
b )1,j)⊕ SB
−1((Cd)1,j ⊕ (K
8
d)1,j) = 01
hold or not. If not, remove the quartet.
7. If the number of the remaining quartets after above steps is two or more, output the corresponding 14
guessed subkey bytes (Ka)0,j1 , (Kc)0,j1 , (K
7
a)1,4, (K
7
b )1,4, (K
8
a)1,j2 and (K
8
b )1,j2 (j1 ∈ {0, 2}, 0 ≤ j2 ≤ 3)
as the correct key information. Otherwise, return to Step 5 and repeat the procedure.
8. If the above 14 subkey bytes are retrieved after Step 7, perform an exhaustive search over all possible
values of the remaining 128 bits of K8a so as to recover the secret key.
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5.1 Analysis of the attack
In Step 6, ten equations (each with probability 2−8) need to be satisfied. Therefore, for a wrong guess of the
above 14 subkey bytes, the expected number of quartets after Step 6 is 213 · (2−8)10 = 2−67. On the other
hand, for a right guess of the key, the expected number of right quartets is about 4. This means that we can
discard all the wrong subkeys (since the expected number of remaining quartets for a wrong subkey is 2−67)
and find the right 14 subkey bytes.
The probability of outputting a wrong key guess in Step 7 is derived by the following Poisson distribution:
X ∼ Poi(λ = 2−67).
As Pr[X ≥ 2] ≈ 2−135, the expected number of wrong key guesses suggested in Step 7 is about (28)14 ·2−135 =
2−23, and the wrong key information can be easily removed in Step 8. Similarly, the probability that two or
more quartets remain after Step 7 for the correct key guess is also computed by the Poisson distribution:
X ∼ Poi(λ = 4).
Since Pr[X ≥ 2] ≈ 0.91, the success probability of the attack on 8-round Rijndael-160/160 is approximately
91%.
5.2 Complexity Issues
The data complexity of this attack is 2109.5 · 217 = 2126.5 chosen plaintexts which are encrypted under Ka,
Kb, Kc and Kd, respectively (resulting in 2
126.5 ·4 = 2128.5 ciphertexts). The memory complexity is primarily
owing to keeping T 1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d, T 2a, T 2b, T 2c and T 2d, thus it can be estimated as 8 ·2125.5 ·20 ≈ 2132.82
bytes.
The time complexity of the attack can be derived as follows:
– For the data collection phase, the time complexity comes from Step 2 and Step 4.
• The time complexity of Step 2 is 2126.5 · 4 = 2128.5 8-round Rijndael-160/160 encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 4 can be estimated as 2125.5 · 8 = 2128.5 memory accesses, which can be
measured as 2128.5 · 120·8 ≈ 2
121.18 8-round Rijndael-160/160 encryptions.
– For the key recovery phase, the time complexity is calculated as follows:
• The time complexity of Step 5 can be estimated as 245 · 216 · 420·8 + 2
29 · 232 · 420·8 ≈ 2
56.68 8-round
Rijndael-160/160 encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 6 can be estimated as 213 · 2112 · 2020·8 = 2
122 8-round Rijndael-160/160
encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 8 is about 2128 8-round Rijndael-160/160 encryptions.
As a result, the total time complexity of the attack is approximately 2129.28 8-round Rijndael-160/160
encryptions.
6 Attack on 10-Round Rijndael-192/192
By using the 8-round distinguisher for round 2–9 given in Subsection 4, we now present a key recovery attack
on 10-round Rijndael-192/192 (round 1–10). Based on Fig. 8, an adversary needs to collect sufficient plaintext
quartets such that among these plaintext quartets there are averagely 8 right quartets with respect to the
8-round distinguisher. Then among all the collected plaintext quartets, the expected number of quartets
satisfying the input and output differences of this distinguisher for a random permutation is (8/2−355) ·
2−384 = 2−26. From this the adversary could distinguish the correct value from the wrong guessed values
of the subkey bytes adopted in rounds 1 and 10 which are related to the 8-round distinguisher with a high
probability. The attack procedure is divided into two phases: data collection phase and key recovery phase.
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Fig. 8. The Related-key Rectangle Attack on 10-Round Rijndael-192/192. Switch is applied in Round 6
Data Collection
1. Collect N structures Gi = {Ui, Vi} of 2
41 plaintexts each, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , Ui, Vi are the sets of 2
40
plaintexts of the form
? c1 c2 c3 ? c4
? c5 c6 c7 c8 c9
? c10 c11 c12 c13 c14
? c15 c16 c17 c18 c19
and
? c1⊕3e c2 c3 ? c4⊕3e
? c5⊕1f c6 c7 c8⊕1f c9⊕1f
? c10⊕1f c11 c12 c13⊕1f c14⊕1f
? c15⊕21 c16 c17 c18⊕21 c19⊕21
respectively, c′is (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) are fixed 8-bit values and ‘?’ takes all possible values.
2. For each structure Gi
(a) Ask for the encryption of Ui, Vi under Ka and Kb, respectively, to obtain G
1
i = {X
1
i , Y
1
i }.
(b) Ask for the encryption of Vi, Ui under Ka and Kb, respectively, to obtain G
2
i = {X
2
i , Y
2
i }.
(c) Ask for the encryption of Ui, Vi under Kc and Kd, respectively, to obtain H
1
i = {Z
1
i ,W
1
i }.
(d) Ask for the encryption of Vi, Ui under Kc and Kd, respectively, to obtain H
2
i = {Z
2
i ,W
2
i }.
3. Let T 1a = {X1i }1≤i≤N , T
1b = {Y 1i }1≤i≤N , T
2a = {X2i }1≤i≤N , T
2b = {Y 2i }1≤i≤N , T
1c = {Z1i }1≤i≤N ,
T 1d = {W 1i }1≤i≤N , T
2c = {Z2i }1≤i≤N and T
2d = {W 2i }1≤i≤N . Then for the case of (T
1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d),
we can construct (240 · 240 · N)2 = 2160 · N2 plaintext quartets meeting the input difference of round
1 given in Fig. 8. Similarly we can obtain 2160 · N2 plaintext quartets satisfying the input difference
of round 1 for (T 1a, T 1b, T 2c, T 2d), (T 2a, T 2b, T 1c, T 1d) and (T 2a, T 2b, T 2c, T 2d), respectively, resulting
in 2160 · N2 · 4 = 2162 · N2 plaintext quartets in total. Among these plaintext quartets there are about
2162 ·N2 · (2−40)2 · 2−355 = 2−273 ·N2 right quartets. Let 2−273 ·N2 = 8, we can deduce that N = 2138.
4. Next, derive ciphertext quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) and corresponding plaintext quartets (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd)
from (T 1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d), (T 1a, T 1b, T 2c, T 2d), (T 2a, T 2b, T 1c, T 1d) and (T 2a, T 2b, T 2c, T 2d) in an efficient
way, such that (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd), (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) satisfy the input and output differences of rounds 1 and
10, respectively, as shown in Fig. 8. Firstly, for the case of (T 1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d) do the following:
– Initialize two vectors Lac and Lbd consisting of 2112 lists Lacη and L
bd
η , respectively, where η corre-
sponds to a 14-byte value (i.e., the bytes (1,0), (1,5) and (i, j) of a ciphertext, where 2 ≤ i ≤ 3,
0 ≤ j ≤ 5), Lacη = {S
a
η , S
c
η, N
a
η , N
c
η}, L
bd
η = {S
b
η, S
d
η , N
b
η , N
d
η }, S
a
η , S
b
η, S
c
η, S
d
η are the sets of ciphertexts
under Ka, Kb, Kc and Kd, respectively, as well as their structure indices, and N
a
η , N
b
η , N
c
η , N
d
η denote
the cardinalities of the sets Saη , S
b
η, S
c
η and S
d
η , respectively.
– For each ciphertext in T 1a, extract the 112-bit value η, then insert the ciphertext and its structure
index into the set Saη of the corresponding list L
ac
η and increase N
a
η by 1. For each ciphertext in T
1c,
xor it with
12
00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 3e
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
and then extract the 112-bit value η. After that, insert the ciphertext and its structure index into
the set Scη of the corresponding list L
ac
η and increase N
c
η by 1. Do similarly for the ciphertexts in
T 1b, T 1d and update the lists Lbdη .
– Discard the lists Lacη in which N
a
η or N
c
η is 0, and remove the lists L
bd
η in which N
b
η or N
d
η is 0. For
each remaining list Lacη , initialize 2
48 lists Lacη,θ = {S
a
η,θ, S
c
η,θ, N
a
η,θ, N
c
η,θ} defined similarly to L
ac
η ,
where θ corresponds to a 6-byte value (i.e., the bytes (0, j), 0 ≤ j ≤ 5), then do the following:
• For each ciphertext in Saη , extract the 48-bit value θ, then insert the ciphertext and its structure
index into the set Saη,θ of the corresponding list L
ac
η,θ and increase N
a
η,θ by 1.
• Let δ1, δ2, . . . , δ127 denote all possible output differences of the S-Box for the input difference 01.
For each ciphertext in Scη, xor it with
00 21 21 21 21 21
00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
and then extract the 48-bit value θ. After that, insert the ciphertext and its structure index
into the set Scη,θ1 , S
c
η,θ2
, . . ., Scη,θ127 of the lists L
ac
η,θ1
, Lacη,θ2 , . . ., L
ac
η,θ127
and increase N cη,θ1 ,
N cη,θ2 , . . ., N
c
η,θ127
by 1, respectively, where θ1, . . ., θ127 denote θ ⊕ (δ1‖δ1‖δ1‖δ1‖δ1‖δ1), . . .,
θ ⊕ (δ127‖δ127‖δ127‖δ127‖δ127‖δ127), respectively.
For each remaining list Lbdη , do similarly to get the lists L
bd
η,θ.
– Keep the lists Lacη,θ in which both N
a
η,θ and N
c
η,θ are non-zero, and keep the lists L
bd
η,θ in which both
N bη,θ and N
d
η,θ are non-zero. Then derive the ciphertext quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) from the remaining
lists Lacη,θ and L
bd
η,θ by using following criteria:
• Ca, Cc are chosen from the same list L
ac
η,θ, and Cb, Cd come from the same list L
bd
η′,θ′ .
• The structure indices of Ca and Cb are the same, and the structure indices of Cc and Cd are the
same.
With the above procedure we obtain around (240 · 240 · 2138)2 · (2−112)2 · ( 127248 )
2 ≈ 2130 ciphertext quar-
tets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) and their plaintext quartets (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd). Do similarly for (T
1a, T 1b, T 2c, T 2d),
(T 2a, T 2b, T 1c, T 1d) and (T 2a, T 2b, T 2c, T 2d), respectively, and finally we get about 2130 · 4 = 2132 cipher-
text quartets (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd) and their plaintext quartets (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd).
Key Recovery
5. Guess the subkey bytes (Ka)j,5, (Kc)j,5 (j ∈ {2, 3, 0}) as follows:
(a) Guess the subkey bytes (Ka)2,5, (Kc)2,5. According to the key schedule and Table 3, derive (∆Kab)1,0,
(∆Kcd)1,0 as below:
(∆Kab)1,0 = SB((Ka)2,5)⊕ SB((Ka)2,5 ⊕ 1f)⊕ 1f,
(∆Kcd)1,0 = SB((Kc)2,5)⊕ SB((Kc)2,5 ⊕ 1f)⊕ 1f.
(b) Guess the subkey bytes (Ka)3,5, (Kc)3,5. Similarly, compute (∆Kab)2,0, (∆Kcd)2,0 in terms of the
key schedule and Table 3.
(c) Guess the subkey bytes (Ka)0,5, (Kc)0,5. Calculate (∆Kab)3,0, (∆Kcd)3,0 from the key schedule and
Table 3.
For each of the remaining quartets in substeps (a)–(c), test whether the corresponding equations
(Pa)((j−1) mod 4),0 ⊕ (Pb)((j−1) mod 4),0 ⊕ (∆Kab)((j−1) mod 4),0 = 0
(Pc)((j−1) mod 4),0 ⊕ (Pd)((j−1) mod 4),0 ⊕ (∆Kcd)((j−1) mod 4),0 = 0
are satisfied or not. If not, discard the quartet. After this step, the number of remaining quartets is about
2132 · (2−8)6 = 284.
13
6. Guess the subkey bytes (Ka)0,4, (Kc)0,4. Then for each remaining quartet (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd), check whether
the equations
SB((Pa)0,4 ⊕ (Ka)0,4)⊕ SB((Pb)0,4 ⊕ (Ka)0,4 ⊕ 3f) = 1f
SB((Pc)0,4 ⊕ (Kc)0,4)⊕ SB((Pd)0,4 ⊕ (Kc)0,4 ⊕ 3f) = 1f
hold or not. If not, remove the quartet. The expected number of remaining quartets after this step is
284 · (2−8)2 = 268.
7. Guess the subkey bytes (Ka)0,0, (Kb)0,0, (Kc)0,0, (Kd)0,0. Then for each remaining quartet (Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd),
test whether the equations
SB((Pa)0,0 ⊕ (Ka)0,0)⊕ SB((Pb)0,0 ⊕ (Kb)0,0) = 1f
SB((Pc)0,0 ⊕ (Kc)0,0)⊕ SB((Pd)0,0 ⊕ (Kd)0,0) = 1f
hold or not. If not, remove the quartet. The expected number of remaining quartets after this step is
268 · (2−8)2 = 252.
8. Guess the subkey bytes (K9a)1,5, (K
9
b )1,5. According to the key schedule and Table 3, derive (∆K
10
ac )0,0,
(∆K10bd )0,0 as below:
(∆K10ac )0,0 = SB((K
9
a)1,5)⊕ SB((K
9
a)1,5 ⊕ 01),
(∆K10bd )0,0 = SB((K
9
b )1,5)⊕ SB((K
9
b )1,5 ⊕ 01).
Then for each remaining quartet (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd), verify whether the equations
(Ca)0,0 ⊕ (Cc)0,0 ⊕ (∆K
10
ac )0,0 = 0
(Cb)0,0 ⊕ (Cd)0,0 ⊕ (∆K
10
bd )0,0 = 0
hold or not. If not, remove the quartet. Note that (∆K10ac )0,0, (∆K
10
bd )0,0 ∈ {δ1, . . . , δ127}, and from Step 4
we know that (Ca)0,0⊕ (Cc)0,0, (Cb)0,0⊕ (Cd)0,0 ∈ {δ1, . . . , δ127}, thus the expected number of remaining
quartets after this step is 252 · (2−7)2 = 238. Moreover, according to Step 4 and Table 3 we have that
for the remaining quartets, (Ca)0,i ⊕ (Cc)0,i = (∆K
10
ac )0,i and (Cb)0,i ⊕ (Cd)0,i = (∆K
10
bd )0,i hold for
1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
9. Guess the subkey bytes (K10a )1,j , (K
10
b )1,j (1 ≤ j ≤ 4) as follows:
(a) guess (K10a )1,1, (K
10
b )1,1 and calculate the values of (K
10
c )1,1, (K
10
d )1,1 by using Table 3.
(b) guess (K10a )1,2, (K
10
b )1,2 and derive the values of (K
10
c )1,2, (K
10
d )1,2 from Table 3.
(c) guess (K10a )1,3, (K
10
b )1,3, (K
10
a )1,4, (K
10
b )1,4 and use Table 3 to obtain the values of (K
10
c )1,3, (K
10
d )1,3,
(K10c )1,4, (K
10
d )1,4.
For each of the remaining quartets in substeps (a)–(c), check whether the corresponding equations
SB−1((Ca)1,j ⊕ (K
10
a )1,j)⊕ SB
−1((Cc)1,j ⊕ (K
10
c )1,j) = 01
SB−1((Cb)1,j ⊕ (K
10
b )1,j)⊕ SB
−1((Cd)1,j ⊕ (K
10
d )1,j) = 01
are satisfied or not. If not, discard the quartet.
10. If the number of the remaining quartets after above steps is six or more, output the corresponding
22 guessed subkey bytes (Ka)i,5, (Kc)i,5, (Ka)0,4, (Kc)0,4, (Ka)0,0, (Kb)0,0, (Kc)0,0, (Kd)0,0, (K
9
a)1,5,
(K9b )1,5, (K
10
a )1,j and (K
10
b )1,j (i ∈ {0, 2, 3}, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4) as the correct key information. Otherwise,
return to Step 5 and repeat the procedure.
11. If the above 22 subkey bytes are retrieved after Step 10, perform an exhaustive search over all possible
values of the remaining 152 bits of Ka so as to recover the secret key.
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6.1 Analysis of the attack
The expected number of remaining quartets after each substep in Step 9 is given as (a) 238 · (2−8)2 = 222,
(b) 222 · (2−8)2 = 26 and (c) 26 · (2−8)4 = 2−26, respectively. Thus for a wrong guess of the above 22 subkey
bytes, the expected number of quartets after Step 9 is 2−26. On the other hand, for a right guess of the key,
the expected number of right quartets is 8.
The probability of outputting a wrong key guess in Step 10 is derived by the following Poisson distribution:
X ∼ Poi(λ = 2−26).
As Pr[X ≥ 6] ≈ 2−165.49, the expected number of wrong key guesses suggested in Step 10 is about (28)22 ·
2−165.49 = 210.51, and the wrong key information can be removed in Step 11. Similarly, the probability
that six or more quartets remain after Step 9 for the correct key guess is also computed by the Poisson
distribution:
X ∼ Poi(λ = 8).
Since Pr[X ≥ 6] ≈ 0.81, the success probability of the attack on 10-round Rijndael-192/192is approximately
81%.
6.2 Complexity Issues
The data complexity of this attack is 2138 · 241 = 2179 chosen plaintexts which are encrypted under Ka, Kb,
Kc and Kd, respectively (resulting in 2
179 · 4 = 2181 ciphertexts). The memory complexity is primarily ow-
ing to keeping T 1a, T 1b, T 1c, T 1d, T 2a, T 2b, T 2c and T 2d, thus it can be estimated as 8·2178 ·24 ≈ 2185.59 bytes.
The time complexity of the attack can be derived as follows:
– For the data collection phase, the time complexity comes from Step 2 and Step 4.
• The time complexity of Step 2 is 2179 · 4 = 2181 10-round Rijndael-192/192encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 4 can be estimated as 2178 · 8 = 2181 memory accesses, which can be
measured as 2181 · 124·10 ≈ 2
173.09 10-round Rijndael-192/192encryptions.
– For the key recovery phase, the time complexity is calculated as follows:
• The time complexity of Step 5 can be estimated as 2132 ·216 · 424·10 +2
116 ·232 · 424·10 +2
100 ·248 · 424·10 ≈
2143.68 10-round Rijndael-192/192encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 6 can be estimated as 284 · 264 · 424·10 = 2
142.09 10-round Rijndael-
192/192encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 7 can be estimated as 268 · 296 · 424·10 = 2
158.09 10-round Rijndael-
192/192encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 8 can be estimated as 252 · 2112 · 424·10 = 2
158.09 10-round Rijndael-
192/192encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 9 can be estimated as 238 ·2128 · 424·10 +2
22 ·2144 · 424·10 +2
6 ·2176 · 824·10 ≈
2177.09 10-round Rijndael-192/192encryptions.
• The time complexity of Step 11 is about 2152 ·210.51 = 2162.51 10-round Rijndael-192/192encryptions.
As a result, the total time complexity of the attack is approximately 2181.09 10-round Rijndael-192/192encryptions.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we performed key recovery attacks on reduced-round versions of Rijndael-160/160/160 and
Rijndael-192/192. Firstly, we constructed a 6-round related-key rectangle distinguisher of Rijndael-160/160/160,
with which we attacked 8 rounds of the cipher. Moreover, we established a 8-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher of Rijndael-192/192, based on which we demonstrated the attack on 10 rounds of the cipher.
Our results show that the related-key rectangle attack is one of the best methods to analyze Rijndael and
Rijndael-like structures. To sum up, none of our attacks directly threatens the security of Rijndael but they
reduce the security margin of the cipher.
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